The Power of the UN to protect Humanity – Part I The Security Council

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UN Security Council meeting on Syria, on December 18, 2015. Take a good look at who raised their hands and who did not (State Department photo/ Public Domain)

 

By Iona Mulder -

 

The UN was founded after the Second World War with the primary goal of protecting peace and security in the world. One of the most important elements of this goal is the protection of people all around the world against similar atrocities that were committed by the Nazi regime; these atrocities are now framed as crimes against humanities and genocide. But who decides and how is decided within this unique and powerful international organization, that currently includes 193 states, that action is necessary to confront issues of crimes against humanity? I will provide insight into this question in a series of several articles. The intention is not to be exhaustive, but to provide a top-down overview of the decision-making process of this powerful organization, to show its competence and its weaknesses. This first article begins with the top of the chain were political decisions for action are taken: the Security Council.

Although the UN as a whole can be seen as leading the politics of the international community, its power is bound by the obligation to respect the sovereignty of states. The right to sovereignty means that the UN cannot interfere within national affairs without the permission of the state itself. This rule is the number one principle of international law. However, the Security Council forms the exception; it is the only organ that can in specific situations interfere with this fundamental principle of sovereignty – even with the use of force, often described as “use of all necessary means”. It can do so in the name of the protection of international peace and security, as described in Chapter VII of the founding charter of the UN. Whether a situation is a threat to peace and security and what measures should be taken, will be determined by a vote of the fifteen states that are a member of the council. There are five permanent members, US, UK, Russia, China, France, those countries that were considered as superpowers after The Second World War, and ten non-permanent that change every two years. These world-changing decisions on peace and security issues are made by the representative of the members states simply raising their hand, as if they were in a classroom. Live-streams of the voting meetings can be viewed at the website UN television. A decision, called a resolution, will be accepted when nine of the members vote in favor, and none of the permanent member uses their right to veto a decision.

Since the end of the eighties, the Security Council has often considered widespread international crimes against humanity as a threat to security of the international community. Examples of such situations are Former Yugoslavia, Somalia, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, The Democratic Republic of the Congo. The more recent case of South-Sudan shows how the decision-making at the Security Council ideally works. Last November 11th, United Nations Special Adviser on the Prevention of Genocide, Adama Dieng, made a visit to the young state of South-Sudan. His role as a Special Advisor is to collect information and advice and warn the Secretary-General and the Security Council of the UN on grave human rights violations of ethnic and racial origin that genocide that might escalate into genocide. The reason for his visit was continuing reports of ethnic violence in South-Sudan. In a speech before the Security Council he stated: “Last week, I saw all the signs that ethnic hatred and targeting of civilians could evolve into genocide if something is not done now to stop it. I urge the Security Council and Members States of the region to be united, and to take action.”

Already since 2011 there is a UN mission stationed within South-Sudan named UNMISS with the mandate to protect civilians, monitor, investigate human rights, and to give assistance to build up the new state. Over the years the mission was already expanded. However, as Adama Dieng has specified within his speech before the Security Council, neither the UNMISS nor strong calls upon the South Sudanese government, not even a ceasefire that was established in 2015, have led to a positive progress of the stability and security of the country. On the contrary, the violence has increased and spread over a larger area; the government army is overall feared by the population, and the current South Sudanese President Kirr made statements that incite even more violence among the different political/ethnic groups within the country.

Following Adama Dieng’s advice and call to take action before the Security Council, the Security Council decided last December 16th to expand the UNMISS even more with 4500 soldiers and broaden its mandate. This mandate now includes among other things the unlimited access for the Special Advisor to monitor, investigate and report on incidents of hate speech and incitement to violence and actively participate in the mission in the implementation of the ceasefire, including the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of different armed groups in South Sudan. In this case, the Security Council took the words of the Special Advisor into account and took action to protect the population of South Sudan. There are, however, two loopholes. First of all, the Security Council is not obligated to council the Special Advisor if the member states are not interested in doing so. Secondly, the member states might not vote for any action or one the permanent members can use its right to veto to uphold any action. This often happens when political interest come into play.

The most compelling example nowadays is the case of Syria. Special Advisor Adama Dieng has made fifteen public statements on the desperate situation of the civil population in Syria. He has not once been invited by the Security Council to speak about this subject. Moreover, Russia has used its veto right six times since the beginning of the conflict to uphold a UN Mission with a mandate regarding the protection of civilians or the persecution of those responsible for violence against civilians and the use of chemical weapons. China has taken the same position five times. The reason for Russia and China to do so is their political alliance with the Syrian government. If they would allow such a UN mission to be implemented, this would minimize the power of the Syrian government and thereby damage their political interested. Henceforth, the Security Council is completely paralyzed to take any action. It is undeniable that the Security Council is failing to fulfill its responsibility to protect the population of Syria.

The situation in Syria is the ultimate display that the UN system to prevent any large-scale human right violations is dependent on the political will of the members of the Security Council and primarily the permanent members. The five permanent member states can stand in the way of the protection of many innocent civilians, merely because it is against their own political interest to so, even when all the other members are of the opinion that measures are imperative to secure the safety of certain populations. It is clear that if the Security Council wants to function as is intended by its founders, the voting powers must be distributed more equitably among the UN member states. This very critical note aside, the Security Council intervenes in some situations to protect civil population when a state is unable or unwilling to protect them, as is shown in the case of South-Sudan. The following question is, of course, will this action minimize or halt the violence. The UN human right protection systems involve many other organs than the Security Council and the Special Advisor. Their role, work and the success of their actions on the ground will be discussed in the following articles of this series.

The Netherlands and “Criminal Refugees” from Afghanistan: political misconceptions

Edo Dijkgraaf - Raad van State (CC-BY)

 

Edo Dijkgraaf - Raad van State (CC-BY)

Edo Dijkgraaf – Raad van State (CC-BY)

 

By Arja Oomkens

 

On 23 September 2016, the Dutch Section of the International Commission of Jurists (NJCM), a commission that focuses on the protection of human rights in the Netherlands, announced that they had filed a lawsuit against the Dutch state for a wrongful act committed with respect to an Afghan person with a valid asylum residence permit.

 

The Afghan asylum-seeker in question fled for fear of persecution by the Taliban during the late 90’s and received asylum in the Netherlands. Eighteen years later, when the Dutch State found out that he had worked for the secret services of the Afghan communist regime (1978-1992), his residence permit was withdrawn without any individual investigation.

 

This was possible because of Dutch immigration policy on Afghanistan (set up in 2000): it stipulates that everyone who has worked for the Afghan secret services between 1978 and 1992 has per definition committed serious human rights abuses and is therefore not entitled to an asylum residence permit. These persons are excluded from the protection guaranteed under the Refugee Convention because they meet the criteria for article 1F of this Convention. Therefore, they are referred to by the Dutch state as so-called “1F-ers,” or in the terms of the media: “criminal asylum-seekers.”

 

The Dutch state is one of the few[1] EU member states that requires alleged “1F-ers” to prove that they were not involved in any human rights abuses. In this specific situation, the Afghan person denied any involvement in 1F classified human rights abuses, since he had only worked within the administrative division of the secret services. Nevertheless, because he did not have any documents to prove his point, the Dutch state applied the 1F principle to withdraw his residence permit.

 

It is important to note in this regard that it is unlikely that any other decision could have been made in a similar situation. Gaibar Hasami, a board-member of the Dutch 1F Foundation, points out that a lot of people that worked for the Afghan secret services did not know that human rights abuses were being committed in the name of their employer. This had to do with the fact that the majority of 80.000 people worked for the “above-ground” secret services, while a minority worked for the “underground” secret services – only the latter committed human rights abuses. However, it is impossible to prove this since the secret services have done everything within their power to hide any evidence that points to human rights abuses. With no evidence available to prove their guilt or innocence, “1F-ers” are excluded from protection based on the premise that there are serious reasons for considering their involvement in human rights abuses two decades ago.

 

Consequently, the Afghan “1F-er” in question appeared before the Council of State, the highest authority in the Netherlands with respect to immigration affairs, to appeal the withdrawal of his residence permit. As with all other appeals with regard to Dutch 1F immigration policy on Afghanistan, the Council of State upheld the decision to withdraw his residence permit.

 

From the perspective of the Afghan “1F-er” and the NJCM this decision violates European Union law because no individual investigation was conducted, and because no reference for a preliminary ruling to the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) in Luxembourg was made. Based on EU law, the withdrawal of residency under such circumstances would mean a wrongful act was committed by the Dutch State. Therefore, the implicated Afghan person and the NJCM now ask the District Court in The Hague to confirm this verdict.

 

Evidently, such a verdict will be in the interest of all alleged Afghan “1F-ers.” Because the situation in Afghanistan is still dangerous for them, many Afghan “1F-ers” – who have lived in the Netherlands for up to 20 years – cannot be expelled by the Dutch State. Their situation nevertheless remains insecure: when the security situation in Afghanistan changes they may be expelled at any time. Is this reasonable when they have built up their family life in the Netherlands? Even though there has never been any investigation into the specific circumstances of their situation?

 

One thing must not be forgotten: Afghan “1F-ers” who have lived in the Netherlands for almost two decades initially applied for asylum because they feared persecution in Afghanistan. In the abovementioned case, the Afghan asylum-seeker entered the Netherlands because of his fear of persecution by the Taliban. The Dutch state considered his story credible and therefore granted him asylum. This means it was considered credible that the Afghan asylum-seeker had been victimized and would be victimized again by the Taliban if sent back. Therefore, Dutch 1F immigration policy on Afghanistan does not protect victims of human rights abuses as it can wrongly exclude asylum-seekers in need of protection.

 

Article 1F is part of a convention drawn up to protect those in need of protection, yet in practice, its application in the Netherlands leads to blatant injustices. Based on political misconceptions of responsibility (both of the state and of the person), it fails to protect those it was designed to. Under 1F, victims are turned into perpetrators, their most fundamental rights upended, and ultimately, their safety and wellbeing compromised. For now, “1F-ers” like the Afghan person in this article have no option but to wait, hoping that the outcome of the lawsuit against the Dutch state can change their situation.

 

[1] Next to the Netherlands, only the Czech Republic consistently reverses the burden of proof with regard to a 1F situation, see this website for more info.

 

Victims and reparations at the ICC

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Logo of the International Criminal Court

 

By Amani Chibashimba (guest writer) -

The International Criminal Court (ICC) was created by the Rome Statute of 1998 in a way to conclude the efforts that have been made to fight international criminality since the end of the Second World War. Its creation is considered to be a success as it derived from a diplomatic agreement between States, which differs from its predecessors, the International Criminal Tribunals (for the ex-Yugoslavia and Rwanda), which were ‘imposed’ by the United Nations. The ICC has jurisdiction over the gravest breach of international law, namely the crimes of genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes. Since it was established by an agreement between states, it does not have a police force and counts on the cooperation of member states to arrest the accused.

In its efforts to fight international criminality, the ICC has brought many new notions that are very likely to influence the development of international criminal justice and international law. The most interesting innovation though, would be the reparation for victims. This notion is framed in the Rome Statute in a very distinct way, as individuals are going to be obliged to provide reparations to victims, following their sentencing, as provided by article 75(2):

The Court may make an order directly against a convicted person specifying appropriate reparation to, or in respect of, victims, including restitution, compensation and rehabilitation

The challenges of the enforcement of the notion of reparation will be the purpose of this article. In international law, the notion of reparation is not new, but the individuation of the reparation will be quite an innovation. International law recognizes mainly the notion of reparation by states. This has been implemented in several cases, where states were to provide reparation following a judgment in which the states misdeed was proven by law. At the ICC only individuals are judged, therefore the ICC reparation will be imposed following the conviction of an accused individual. Reparation is thus linked to individual criminal liability. The first two convictions at the ICC in the cases of Lubanga (December 2014) and Katanga (May 2014) – both related to the situation in Congo – gave the ICC the opportunity to implement Article 75 for the first time.

On the 7th August 2012 Trial Chamber I of the ICC issued a decision in the case against Thomas Lubanga for the first time on the principles that would be applied to reparations for victims. Here, two challenges were already deplorable: Mr. Lubanga was declared bankrupt and individual reparation for his victims was impossible to conceive. Lubanga was convicted for conscripting and enlisting children under the age of 15 in armed groups and using them to participate actively in hostilities. He was accused to have done this in the district of Ituri, meaning we have countless potential victims from whom to draw those eligible for reparation. Since it was not possible to award individual reparation, it was decided that collective reparation should be awarded by creating activities that would be beneficial for the victims. On 3rd March 2015, the Appeal Chamber issued its final decision on this matter and decided that the Trust Fund for Victims (TFV) should present a draft for collective reparation in this case.

The Courts TFV has been involved in collective assistance projects related to child soldiers in the DRC. When the final decision will be issued, it will be most definitely drawn from those existing projects. Also for this case, since Lubanga is not financially able to provide reparation for its countless victims, the Court has decided that the TFV should be the one presenting a plan for reparation. However, we should be aware that neither the Rome Statute, nor the Rules of Procedure and Evidence (RPE), nor the TFV Regulation mention that the TFV should be a substitute body tasked to provide reparation for a convicted person declared bankrupt by the Court. Nevertheless, TFV regulation 42 states that the resources of the Trust Fund shall be for the benefit of the victims of crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court…”, this is why it was admissible for the Court to order the TFV to act as a substitute body and repair the victims of Mr. Lubanga.

On 27th August 2014, the Courts Trial Chamber II issued an order to the Registry to report on applications for reparation for the case against Germain Katanga, the second case. Unlike Lubanga, Katanga was convicted for crimes committed in a specific village (Bogoro) on a specific day (24th February 2003). Awarding reparation for this case will be dependent on those two elements. In 2003, some 364 victims were recognized to participate in the trial for the Katanga case. These are supposed to be people who have suffered acts for which Katanga was accused, meaning they have suffered from the attack which happened in the village of Bogoro in the morning of the 24th February 2003.

It is important to remember that Mr. Katanga was convicted for much less acts than he was charged. His charges included: willful killing, murder, directing an attack against a civilian population as such, destruction of property, pillage, using children under the age of 15 to participate actively in hostilities, sexual slavery, and rape. However, in his conviction, only four charges were retained: as an accessory for murder (as a crime against humanity and as a war crime), attack against a civilian population as such, destruction of enemys property, and pillaging. This means that not all the victims who participated in the proceedings as witnesses for the crimes he was charged with, will be included in the reparation process. This applies, for example, to women who were raped or enslaved following the attack of Bogoro village.

Looking at these two cases and thinking of what the reparation scheme is going to be, one can see already some challenging aspects which will come out in time of actually awarding reparations or implementing those decisions. We should keep in mind the nature of the crimes and their impact on the victims as well as the essence and meaning of the intended reparation. Despite the fact that the victims in both cases are entitled to reparation, it will be hard to apply the same rules in both situations, as the circumstances in both cases are fundamentally different. However, the reparations will depend on the same three key elements: conviction; definition of beneficiary, and applicability of the principles provided for by the Rome Statute and RPE.

Concerning the conviction in the case of Katanga, it is likely that there will be a lot of frustration as many victims will be excluded from the reparation process because the crimes for which they were victimized were not part of the conviction. It will be challenging to explain to a woman who was raped on the 24th February 2003 during the attack of Bogoro, that she is not a suitable’ victim for this case because the prosecutor did not prove his case beyond reasonable doubt. Does this mean they are not victims? How to recognize their victimhood? This is likely to influence the very essence of reparation and the perception of justice the Court has been striving for. Concerning the definition of victimwho will benefit from reparation, this will be very narrow. In the case of Katanga, only those inhabitants of Bogoro (or strangers who happened to be present there on the morning of the 24th February 2003) who suffered an injury (physical, moral or material) due to the misdeed of Mr. Katanga, shall be considered. However, proving that you were in the village that day will prove to be challenging, especially because everybody fled, some for good, some to return only after many years.

The case against Lubanga opens another practical question: who are victims? Lubanga was convicted for conscripting children in the whole district of Ituri, in which large number of people live. In addition, he committed this crime more than a decade ago, which makes it less likely for the victims to come forward now. Overall, it will be challenging to apply the principles, as laid down in the Statute and the RPE, to actual cases. With regard to, for example, the indigence of the defendants, adjustments must be made. The main reason why those rules have to be laid down is, to my opinion, to make sure that they lay down the path for the development of more adequate and inclusive principles. They should then be flexible.

The final decisions on the reparation for both cases are still pending. It will be interesting to see if there will be similarities between the two very different cases when it comes to applying those principles of reparation. We have already witnessed some of the shortcomings, namely the insolvency of the defendant, the enormous amount of destruction to be repaired, or the huge number of concerned victims. The challenge will be for the ICC to provide for a reparation scheme which will reinforce its legitimacy. Adding to its already controversial review, another failure in the form of ill-placed or unsatisfactory reparations will only serve to decrease its consideration and question its legitimacy.

The Voice of an Ignored Community. The Tibetan Government in Exile

KL Lau/Drepung Monatery (CC BY-NC-ND)

 

KL Lau/Drepung Monatery (CC BY-NC-ND)

KL Lau/Drepung Monatery (CC BY-NC-ND)

 

By Sarah Weber (guest writer) – 

It is now almost seventy years ago that China annexed Tibet and ever since the Tibetans have suffered repression, injustice and loss of individual freedom. The People’s Republic of China (PRC) invaded Tibet in 1950, referring to it as the “peaceful liberation of Tibet”. Initially, the PRC granted national regional autonomy and cultural freedom. The seventeen point agreement, the document that is seen to affirm Chinese sovereignty over Tibet, guaranteed that the existing political system and the authority of the Dalai Lama would not be altered. In reality, Tibet’s whole structure has changed and in fact a slow cultural genocide is taking place.

Today, Tibetans are confronted with forced assimilation and the destruction of their cultural heritage. Those who demand independence or oppose the Chinese rule are arrested, tortured and given long prison terms on charges of Disturbing National Security. Moreover, the Chinese government encourages a large number of ethnic Han Chinese immigrants to settle in Tibet, reducing the Tibetans to a minority in their own country. This in turn leads to an economic marginalization; 70% of business in the capital, Lhasa, are now owned or run by ethnic Chinese. In schools, the Tibetan language has been severely restricted and Tibetan textbooks replaced by Chinese ones.

Regarding the religious infrastructure, the Cultural Revolution has caused the destruction of over 6000 monasteries and religious institutions, equating to 95% of the overall total. Only a few monasteries are left and they function more as tourist attractions than spiritual centers. On top of that, since the occupation, an estimated number of 1.2 Million Tibetans have been killed in labour camps and prisons and around 130,000 live in exile today. 6 Million Tibetans still live inside Tibet.

It seems that the international community has abandoned its outspoken commitment to human rights in the case of Tibet and hardly any country’s leadership is willing to oppose China. Gains in commerce and trade are considered far more important than the cessation of human rights violations or preservation of an ancient culture. For the Tibetans, however, the issue is pressing and whether they live in exile or not, it is of utmost importance that there is a movement that protects the struggle for freedom, the culture and its people.

The 14th Dalai Lama, Tenzin Gyatso, escaped to India on March 10, 1959 followed by some 80.000 Tibetans. Upon arrival, he immediately introduced democratic reforms including the foundation of a government in exile, the Central Tibetan Administration (CTA), currently seated in Dharamsala, India. The CTA’s task is to rehabilitate refugees, to protect Tibetan culture and language by promoting an efficient school system and to oversee religious affairs. Additionally, it attempts to draw the attention of the world to the crisis unfolding in Tibet whilst ensuring the continuity of the freedom struggle. The CTA’s ongoing focus on education as a central tenant of the state stands in stark contrast to the worldwide trend of shrinking the welfare state and demonstrates its commitment to social values. The CTA is composed of seven different departments representing priorities of the Tibetan community at large namely Religion & Culture, Home, Finance, Education, Security, Information & International Relations and Health.

Next to a popularly elected prime minister and a parliament of 43 members, this government includes a judiciary. The highest judicial authority in the exile community is the “Tibetan Supreme Justice Commission”. The Commission is responsible for adjudicating civil disputes within the community but does not handle criminal cases, as this is recognized as the preserve of host governments. The function of the CTA is governed by a constitution, “The Charter of Tibetans in Exile”. The charter ensures a clear separation of power among the three branches of government and it professes to adhere to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. The prime minister is elected for a period of five years and the next election is due to take place in March 2016.

The CTA’s experiment with modern democracy is a preparation for a future free Tibet. Yet, it is not designed to be the institution that will take power thereafter. The Dalai Lama has announced that the exile government will be dissolved as soon as Tibet attains freedom and that power will be transferred to a transitional government headed by an interim-president for at most two years. Thereafter, power will be handed over to a popularly elected government. 

The challenge of every exile government is to exercise legal power whilst residing in another country and to run a state that effectively does not exist. Any government, whether in exile or not, matters mainly when it is recognized by other governments and a majority of the people it claims to representFor the Tibetans, both inside and outside Tibet, the CTA is recognized as the sole and legitimate representation and the CTA maintains that Tibet is an independent state under unlawful occupation. Yet, the question is whether an exile government can ever be legitimate according to international law. The notion remains a relative concept, as every state can decide who it accepts as a legitimate government. Officially, Tibet is an integral part of China so the government in exile is internationally not considered legitimate, since that would imply a change in the legal status of Tibet. Most countries maintain friendship with China and therefore avoid taking a position in favor of the Tibetan cause for fear of commercial ramifications. So practically, the CTA’s mandate is legally void. Yet, for the Tibetans its existence is essential for survival.

The establishment of the CTA is a rather unique example in the history of statesmanship. The Dalai Lama had to convince Tibetans to accept a democratic administration in which he would no longer be the head of state, as was traditionally his role. Step by step, he ceded power until he eventually stepped down in 2001. Compared to other cases, where the head of state clinches on to power, unwilling to step down, even ready to unleash a civil war, the Tibetan democratization process is a particular example as the process has been top-down in contrast to normal democratization processes. Moreover, the mandate of exile governments is mostly temporary and only transitional, often set up for a time of war and for the redevelopments thereafter. The CTA, however, has existed for almost seventy years and can be expected to exist for the indefinite future.

An international community should prioritize the protection of human rights and the prevention of a cultural genocide over economic interests. Unfortunately this is not the case. So even if the CTA is currently not able to influence the situation in Tibet directly, with its work it guarantees that the struggle for existence goes on. It is the voice of a muted people that makes sure that those silenced by circumstance and injustice are given the most basic of rights; a voice to be heard with.

 

 

 

 

Housing for Refugees in the Netherlands: austere and just?

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Container homes – Inhabitat (CC BY-NC-ND)

 

By Arja Oomkens -

 

Last November, the Dutch government decided that housing for refugees with a temporary residence permit must be “austere and just”. In effect, this meant the development of austerity measures to regularize housing for these refugees in empty governmental buildings (e.g. former offices), in one of the (to be built) 14,000 small-scale homes (e.g. containers), or in homes where at least four households are able to live together (e.g. student rooms). In addition to these measures, the government plans to change the 2014 Housing Act – in specific the part that prioritizes refugees for social housing. This topic has been part of a heated public debate over the past few months, since the prioritization of refugees has made many low-income Dutch citizens feel disadvantaged for being on a never-ending waiting list for social housing. In this sense, the (planned) austerity measures seem a step in the right direction, as they both address pressure on the social housing market as well as relieve increased tension towards refugees.

 

But how crucial and just are these measures really?

 

These measures cannot be deemed crucial simply by referring to the pressure of 24,000 refugees in need of housing. Especially since there is another important reason for pressure on the social housing sector: namely the decision of the government in 2013 to liberalize one million social housing facilities. In other words, of the 2,7 million houses available in the Netherlands, one million are to be sold – 2014 already saw the sale of about 7000 social houses. As a consequence, the liberalization of social housing facilities makes access to social housing more difficult for everyone, not just low-income Dutch citizens. It is therefore not rationally justifiable to develop office and container homes for refugees and present it as the sole solution to an already pressurized social housing market.

 

Furthermore, it is discriminatory to differentiate between refugees and low-income Dutch citizens by requiring refugees to live in austere, second-rate, housing facilities. In this regard, the UN Refugee Convention and European Union Law do not protect refugees’ interests sufficiently. Article 21 of the 1951 UN Refugee Convention indicates that state parties “shall accord to refugees lawfully staying in their territory treatment as favorable as possible” and the 2004 EU-Qualification Directive requires that refugees must “have access to accommodation under equivalent conditions as other third country nationals legally resident in their territories.” Both of these definitions are problematic as they leave room for differentiation between Dutch citizens and refugees with a temporary residence permit. This differentiation, in the form of austerity measures for refugees, is contrary to the obligations of the Netherlands under the International Convention of the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination (ICERD). Under this Convention, racial discrimination occurs when a person or group is treated differently because of their national origin. According to article 5 of the Convention, states must guarantee the right of everyone to equality before the law in the enjoyment of the freedom of residence. It is therefore questionable whether it is possible to require refugees to live in offices, or containers.

 

Next to this legal issue, it is also important to explore the social impact of the austerity measures. Will they be effective in the long term?

 

In the short term, by depressurizing the social housing market and placing refugees in office or container homes, the increasing tension amongst low-income Dutch citizens towards refugees may be diffused. But from an overcrowded asylum-seekers’ center to an abandoned office building, refugees are required to live on the outskirts of Dutch society, making the integration process more difficult. Needless to say, this is detrimental to their livelihoods and wellbeing. Only after five years are refugees with a temporary residence permit eligible for permanent residency, but only if they can indicate that they are sufficiently integrated and pass all Dutch language exams. It is more likely that refugees who are isolated in office or container homes will be denied permanent residency. Accordingly, the austerity measures are problematic as they assume that conflicts in those countries where people are fleeing from will cease soon, yet all indications point to the contrary. Therefore, while the Dutch government on the one hand stresses the importance of integration, the austerity measures in place on the other hand do not reconcile with this important objective.

 

By July 2016, the government hopes to have amended the law that prioritizes refugees for social housing. This article attempts to show the illegitimacy of such measures and what this means for the integration of refugees in the long term. In short, pressure on the social housing market cannot solely be ‘blamed’ on the influx of refugees to the Netherlands; differentiating between refugees and low-income Dutch citizens is contrary to the obligations of the Netherlands under the ICERD; and placing refugees in offices and container homes is detrimental to the integration process. Refugees do not have a family network to resort to or depend on: their families have often been torn apart by war and persecution in their home countries. For the same reason, refugees will not be able to repatriate soon. Therefore, it is of the utmost importance that the Dutch government, along with its citizens, starts to think about the implications and long-term effects of its austerity measures. Because sustainable peace in countries such as Syria, Afghanistan, or Eritrea, is not feasible, and worldwide displacement has never been recorded higher than today, an open attitude towards the integration of refugees is imperative.